DAY ALGERIA FOILED AN ISRAELI ATTEMPT TO BOMB THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANISATION GATHERING IN ALGIERS IN 1988



ALGER - Almost everything has been said about the proclamation of the Palestinian state in Algiers 30 years ago. But the story of the planned Israeli attack on the Palace of Nations and thwarted by the Algerian army, five days earlier, is much less well known.

It all began on January 1 st October 1985, 800 kilometers from Algiers. Tunis then saw the unthinkable.

The small suburb of Tunis, Hammam Chott, is bombed by an Israeli air strike targeting the headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Force 17. The losses are height: 68 people including 50 Palestinians dead among them many leaders.

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By successfully perpetrating this attack under everybody's, including the United States, allies and friends of Tunisia, Israel has managed to prove that it had the technical and logistical capabilities to strike its targets without loss or undue risk taking, even 3,000 kilometers from his bases, and ensuring a precious surprise effect in his psychological war against the Palestinian resistance.


Operation "Leg of Wood" , authorized by Prime Minister Shimon Peres, was a real technical and tactical feat. At the time, stealth was not yet relevant, the Mediterranean was studded with naval forces from both sides of the Cold War, and Libya was at open war with the US Sixth Fleet.

To carry out its plan, the Israeli Air Force used two Boeing 707 tankers, disguised as airliners, and ten F-15 fighter bombers to dump their ammunition on the PLO headquarters. All in absolute radio silence and flight configurations mimicking those of civil airlines while remaining far from any visual observations of the line pilots who can report them.


Six F-15B and F-15D's 106 th Squadron "Spearhead" opened training. Each aircraft had an American-made GBU-15 electro-optical guided bomb under its wings, the gondola needed to guide these weapons, and four AIM-7 Sparrow missiles for self-defense.

Tail were two F-15C of the 133 th squadron "Twin Tail", armed with missiles AIM-7 Sparrow and AIM-9 Sidewinder and six Mark 82 conventional bombs.


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Shortly before entering Tunisian airspace, the formation split into two flights of four, separated by four minutes. Two of the F-15s experienced various avionics failures and were forced to interrupt the mission. The other crews had to redistribute targets between them.

The first three aircraft dropped their guided bombs twenty kilometers off Hammam Chott. Two others followed them a few seconds later. Later, the two late F-15Cs finished the job by dropping their conventional bombs on the target now "marked" by the plume of smoke rising from the Palestinian compound.

A threat taken seriously

In Algeria, the Israeli attack is like a bomb. The decision is made to evacuate urgently the military camp of Fatah, Tebessa, about ten kilometers from the border of Tunisia since its became within reach by the enemy.

Palestinian soldiers are taken to distant El Bayadh in the south-west and its resembling American western landscapes.

"Fortifying anti-aircraft defenses in Tebessa in anticipation of an Israeli surprise attack required positioning radars in Tunisia, and even anti-aircraft batteries," Middle East Eye reported from a retired colonel who oversaw air defense, in the east of the country.

"At that time, President Bourguiba was facing a Tunisian push to break off diplomatic relations with the United States, thus rejecting the Algerian military support that was offert to him to protect Tunisia.

Three years later in Algiers , when the decision to proclaim the creation of a Palestinian state (only known only to a handful of people) the possibility of an Israeli attack was taken very seriously.

To counter the threat, the risk assessment is carried out for three months and then the security measures were prepared. "Algeria has never been so much on the war footing. Even in the face of the Moroccan threat, we had never taken such measures! " a captain who took part in the preparations for the summit, told MME

"In 1988, the capabilities of the Algerian army were at their climax: it never had so many planes, anti-aircraft missiles, and the personnel who operated them were trained and were at the top of their game.


In general, all radars and anti-aircraft systems were on alert. Two high-speed interceptors and two MiG-21 fighters are sent on a permanent patrol. Alert crews take turns on the ground and in the cockpit of their aircraft, in Blida, Boufarik, Annaba and Oran.

In September 1988, officers of the 11 th group of anti-aircraft missiles, based in Algiers, were responsible for establishing a defense perimeter away from the capital. They have at their disposal three sites, in Reghaia, Ouled Fayet and Eucalyptus, and a complete regiment of Pechora missiles capable of shooting down a plane 25 kilometers away.

The preparation mission consists in verifying that all the equipments are parameterized and calibrated and that the means of communication with the commands work.

The men of the 31 th Group of ground-air missile batteries (GBMSA), which depend on the defense against aircraft of the Army ,based in Annaba, in the east of the country and in Ain Oussara, south of Algiers, they must identify the best places to deploy the OSA-AK short-range anti-aircraft missile batteries.

The choice is on the summit overlooking the district of Ain Benian, west of the capital. With a panoramic view of the entire bay of Algiers, this position is located not far from the Palais des Nations where the conference is to be held.

The military was ordered to establish a no-fly zone of twenty kilometers radius around the capital and a 200-kilometer control zone.


On the very site of the Palais des Nations where the PLO meeting was held, they deployed short-range Strela 2M missile batteries on armored vehicles. They are the last resort in the event that the enemy manages to thwart the radar and approach the site.

The 31 th GBMSA also has its own reconnaissance and fire control Battery (BRCT) that includes, back, Soviet radars P15 radar and PRV that determine long distances the position and altitude of the enemy.

All the data captured by the different radars used are centralized and transmitted 60 kilometers south of Algiers in Mount Chréa, to what is called the Center of Detection and Control (CDC) responsible for giving the firing order and to direct aviation for possible interceptions.


Radar echo

In Annaba, 500 kilometers east of the capital, another CDC handles threats from the east, mirroring the center of Chréa.

At sea, the Algerian navy comes to give more ground radars with Koni corvettes deployed between Algiers and Annaba. Underwater, all Algerian submarines where out for more than two months. Two Romeos and two brand-new Kilos to chase possible intruders.

At the end of October at least one Soviet frigate deploys in Algiers, a Krivak. Its powerful radar gives additional detection capabilities. A second frigate reportedly patrolled off the Algerian seaboard.

At that time, the Soviets had placed their ship on the cargo dock of the port of Algiers, visible by all the chancelleries whose seats overlooked the port.

On November 10, as the congress begins, a radar echo is captured by Algerian radar in Annaba and Algiers. It represents a tight formation of unknown hunters arriving from the eastern Mediterranean. They had branched off towards Sardinia after having passed Sicily and had regrouped to point to the south.

In parallel, tells an officer of the CDC Chréa to MEE , a listening station captures the communications of an Air France pilot flying over Sicily. He asked if a NOTAM (Notice to Airmen) bulletin for any military exercise had been issued when he saw unidentified and armed aircraft near his flight.

In Reghaia, east of Algiers, the BTRC 31 th GBMSA that captures the echoes anticipates events and request confirmation of the order of shooting at the CDC.

At Club des Pins, where the Palais des Nations is, we are about to evacuate the hall. What the captain of the GBMSA does not know is that the CDC does not intend to let the threat come closer to the ground defenses and takes off two MiG-25s, two MiG-21s and two MiG-23 MFs.

"Everyone was 100% sure that 'they [Israelis] would come back and attack! As a result, the Algerians deployed one of their SA-6 sites nearby and created a no-fly zone within a radius of 20 kilometers around Club des Pins. A pair of MiG-25s were conducting a high-altitude combat air patrol, and two at mid-altitude, whenever senior Palestinian representatives met. Additional interceptors were on alert at their bases, "says Tom Cooper, author specializing in the history of military aviation, in an article that traces this episode.

"As expected, '' they '' have come. On 10 November 1988, Algerian early warning radars detected suspicious radar contact formation from the east. An Algerian radar has detected a number of distant contacts in the east, approaching an average level, "reports a retired Tunisian officer in the article by Tom Cooper. "Immediately, a pair of MiG-23s and one of MiG-25 took off to strengthen four MiGs already on the CAP compared to the Club of Pines. "

"The Algerians did not incite them to intercept the Israelis, who were still far too far away. They ordered their MiGs to climb and take up positions in front of the planes. Because of the Algerian activity, we also went on alert. Our radars then detected two groups of aircraft. At the time and place, no commercial or military activity was planned or announced. "

The tension in the heavens and on the ground then begins to increase. In the next few minutes, more and more Algerian and Tunisian radar stations light up and begin to follow the incoming training. According to the retired Tunisian officer, the vigilance of the Algerian anti-aircraft defenses "has finally had an effect".

"It's just a guess, but I think they've detected all this electromagnetic activity. They followed a radial trajectory for a moment, then returned to the east. They were not afraid of us, nor Algerians. But for their raid to succeed, they wanted to touch the PLO without suffering losses. That's why they decided to cancel their attack. "


Originally copied from Nairaland: https://www.nairaland.com/1386870/african-militaries-security-services-strictly/1777


           

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